

meaningful zero point, represents measurement at all.

Howe never mentions that IQ correlations between unrelated adults reared together are zero, whereas IQ correlations between identical twins reared apart are about .72, well above that of fraternal twins reared together. These findings indicate that sociological correlates of IQ are causally weak and that Howe's efforts to discredit heritability and mainstream science on intelligence are suspect.

A 1946 study by Bernardine Schmidt is cited as evidence for the great malleability of IQ. Howe reports only that her "investigation was criticized on a number of counts" and blithely insists, "but the main findings appear to be genuine." Criticism of Schmidt's unreplicated claims for massive IQ gains stopped just short, however, of declaring them fraudulent.

Howe reports the average black-white difference in IQ as 10 points, when, in fact, it is typically close to 18. Without alerting readers to its aberrant nature, he has apparently chosen to report only the inexplicably low value observed for the middle age group (7-11) from the 1986 standardization of the Stanford-Binet.

The Nazi genocide is distractingly injected and the Pioneer Fund, which has supported much IQ research, is consequently maligned in a familiar manner. Howe reports, "Its treasurer, John B. Trevor, worked for a group that was named in a . . . Justice Department sedition indictment for pro-Nazi activities." Unsuspecting readers might conclude that Trevor's group had been indicted; gullible ones might assume further that this somehow invalidated certain findings about IQ that conflict with Howe's views.

Trevor's father, who was never a Pioneer officer, had been president in 1942 of the American Coalition of Patriotic Socie-

ties, for which his son, the Pioneer treasurer, later worked. Both Trevors bear the same name. A "Coalition of Patriotic Societies" was merely listed in 1942 as one of many organizations targeted by the persons who actually were indicted, and the name John Trevor, to the senior Trevor's distress, was identified with the organization in a handout at a Justice Department press conference. Neither the senior Trevor nor other members of the organization were among those indicted, Howe's misleading reference to "named" notwithstanding.

Eventually, a charge against Trevor senior similar to Howe's was published in 1954 by Ralph McGill, of the *Atlanta Constitution*, and Trevor sued for libel. Armed with an affidavit from the U.S. assistant attorney general who had conducted the grand jury investigation resulting in the sedition indictment, Trevor's executors were able to prove after his death that both Trevor and the American Coalition were completely exculpated, and thus could secure a retraction from McGill in 1957. Perhaps Sage Publications will prove as gracious.

ROBERT A. GORDON

Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore
Maryland

JENSEN, ARTHUR R. 1998. *The g Factor: The Science of Mental Ability*. Pp. xiv, 648. Westport, CT: Praeger. \$39.95.

In 1969, Arthur Jensen published an article in *Harvard Educational Review* titled "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" The answer, according to Jensen, was essentially "not much." Jensen argued two basic points: (1) most attempts to raise IQ had achieved, at best, modest effects; and (2) partly based on the failure of attempts to

raise IQ, the preponderance of evidence indicated that IQ was primarily the outcome of inherited, rather than environmental, influences. The controversy over such assertions (both ones made in his article and others not made but misinterpreted by critics) was like no other before or since in modern psychology. Jensen's latest book finds him still answering these critics. Jensen has devoted his career to refining and bolstering his initial arguments about general intelligence (called *g* by Spearman in 1904) and to demonstrating the genetic basis for *g* in explaining racial differences.

During this period, Jensen has not been in the eye of the hurricane of controversy but, rather, at the leading edge. He has published widely on intelligence, including experimental studies and theoretical treatises. He has attempted in previous books to answer critics but also to explain the issues to the informed lay audience. This most recent book falls somewhere between these two endpoints; the book is full of highly technical information, but it is presented so that a scientifically minded lay audience can understand. He also presents a wealth of citations to original research and extensive technical notes.

This book presents the most rigorous arguments for the existence of *g* and a description of the consequences of individual differences in *g*, for example, in terms of education, social, and economic success. Jensen describes the psychological, genetic, and biological determinants of *g* in excruciating detail. If a reader starts with the notion that general intelligence is a fictional concept, this work will easily dispel such a belief.

What this book does not do, though, is present a balanced treatment of the literature. Jensen is best at slaying extreme critics (for example, those who hold that there is no genetic component of intelligence or that Howard Gardner's theory of multiple intelligences falsifies a

theory of general intelligence), but he is an advocate for a particular view. Far too few troublesome facts (of which many exist) from the extant literature are included for discussion. Jensen's book is clearly a testimony to the insights of Spearman. However, in some ways, the book suffers from the same flaw as in Spearman's unique use of factor analysis (a critical tool for deriving *g*). When data were found that did not fit Spearman's "hierarchical order," investigators were instructed to "purify" the measures (that is, throw out the offending data) so that the data fit the theory.

In the final analysis, general intelligence or *g* is important in the same way that Newton's theory of gravity is important. It makes many important and useful predictions (and these are pointed out quite cogently in Jensen's book). However, Newton's theory was but one step in the endless search for a reductionistic truth, rather than truth itself. Jensen's theory can be no greater and still remain scientific (that is, falsifiable)—a fundamental truth that does not receive much attention in this work.

PHILLIP L. ACKERMAN

Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta

ECONOMICS

REDMAN, DEBORAH A. 1997. *The Rise of Political Economy as a Science: Methodology and the Classical Economists*. Pp. xviii, 471. Cambridge: MIT Press. \$55.00.

This is a study of both the methodology of the English classical political economists and the philosophical sources upon which they presumably relied. The principal sources on which Redman concentrates are, not surprisingly, Francis Bacon, René Descartes, John Herschel,