Book reviews

References


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This book constitutes a major achievement; it must rank as a fundamental source book for all writings concerned with the area of intelligence, race, social class, and educational achievement. Taking off from Jensen's well-known article in the Harvard Educational Review (reprinted in Jensen's recently published book, Genetics and Education), it goes well beyond the earlier work by covering the ground more systematically and in much greater detail; also, and this is perhaps more important, Jensen adduces recent evidence, much of it due to him and his co-workers, which greatly strengthens his case that the observed differences in educability are largely due to genetic causes. To those who answer that it is not intelligence that determines a person's social class, even in part, but rather class that determines intelligence (through poor education and other social influences), he offers a detailed statistical argument which is conclusive. Indeed, there is now so much evidence that the argument should be laid to rest. It has been shown that within the same family the brighter children are upwardly mobile, the duller ones downward; this in spite of the fact that educational and other social influences are equal for both. It has been shown that in spite of genetic regression to the mean, the differences in IQ between social classes has remained identical over three generations now (with equal variances); this is impossible unless there were considerable social mobility, highly correlated with IQ. Independent evidence is available to document this social mobility, both in the USA and the UK. Jensen gives a masterly survey of all the evidence; it will be interesting to see how the many educationists who have hitherto refused to listen to the voice of reason, and who have clung to an unmodified environmentalism, will receive this clear message. On the evidence of past experience, they will (1) not read the book, but (2) will argue against the conclusion, using (3) arguments which are irrelevant, or contradicted by the facts adduced by Jensen. As Galileo already found, you cannot make people look through your
telescope who are convinced, either that they are absolutely in the right, so that it
would be a waste of time to look, or else that they may very well be in the wrong, so
that it would be embarrassing to be found out!

Only one example can be given of the new material introduced by Jensen; I have
picked on an experiment that to me shows something very near to genius—in the
sense that Jensen has taken a problem which has been declared insoluble by many
experts, and has suggested a simple, straightforward method for solving it. The
problem is that of linking up in some way data from white and black groups so as
to obtain direct evidence of the presence, or absence, of genetic causes for the
observed IQ differences between them. Professor Bodmer has stated that such a
question cannot be answered, except by having available a freely intermarrying
population of blacks and whites in a colour-blind society, and many geneticists
have expressed similar views. One can, of course, obtain suggestive results, and
Jensen has argued the case powerfully in his previous book; nevertheless, indirect
arguments of that kind did not cut much ice, and reasonable criticisms could be
brought forward against his conclusions. In my book on Race, Intelligence and
Education I concluded that the genetic evidence was insufficient to arrive at a rea-
onable conclusion, even though it tended in the direction of genetic implication.
Now Jensen has cut the Gordian knot by making use of the mechanism of genetic
regression to the mean. He takes a black and a white child, equal in IQ (say 120);
this proves beyond any doubt that the environment in which the black child was raised
was adequate enough to allow him to develop his intelligence sufficiently to come out
equal with his white partner. Jensen now seeks out the siblings of the two children
involved, and measures their IQ. These siblings, in each case, are brought up in the
same sort of environment as their proband brothers and sisters; they should show a
regression to the mean in IQ, i.e. have lower IQs than the probands. The crucial
question, of course, is: to what mean do these children regress? On an environmental
hypothesis, regression should be to the same mean, i.e. the IQ = 100 mark; this is
predicted on the basis that any IQ differences between blacks and whites are due to
environmental differences. These differences have been ruled out almost entirely
by the original matching procedure, and consequently the prediction stands.

On a genetic or interactionist hypothesis, however, we would predict that the
IQs of the children should regress to the respective racial means—that of the whites
to 100, that of the blacks to 85 or thereabouts. In his experiment, Jensen found
regression lines to be straight, and regression to be to the separate racial means—
white children in the example quoted regressed to an IQ of 110, black children to one
of 100 (approximately). Jensen extends the argument, and suggests many other
experiments which could be done; regression analyses from white and black parents
matched on IQ are an obvious example. This is a very inadequate presentation of a
lengthy argument; readers are invited to see for themselves whether they agree
that Jensen has succeeded in solving this particular very thorny problem.

Jensen, of course, is on a good wicket; the facts are pretty overwhelming in
indicating the great importance of genetic influences wherever IQ (or indeed personality, too) is concerned. Critics sometimes argue that (1) IQ tests are made by middle-class, white psychologists for middle-class, white children, and that it is not surprising that (2) coloured, working-class, or otherwise deprived children don't do at all well on these tests. But consider that Eskimo children do if anything slightly better than white Canadian children on 'culture fair' IQ tests; this is completely incompatible with the pseudo-syllogism advanced by the critics. Either the tests are in fact biased in favour of the white children, in which case there is evidence here of racial differences (Eskimos are greatly superior to whites), or the races are not in fact different, in which case the tests cannot be unfair to non-white groups. Similarly, oriental children in the USA do better on these tests than white children, even though the white children are of superior socio-economic status; how do the environmentalists deal with this objection? As Jensen piles fact on fact, it becomes increasingly obvious that his critics have no leg left to stand on; the evidence is simply too strong to be gainsaid.

Jensen goes painstakingly through the many objections that have been raised to his argument; he examines such issues as inequality of schooling, teacher expectations, motivational factors, language deprivation, cultural bias in IQ tests, physical environment, etc. He misses (because the data were only very recently published) the interesting Dutch starvation study, which is very relevant to the malnutrition argument. During the war, certain provinces in Holland were systematically starved by the Nazis as a reprisal; many people died of malnutrition. Yet the children conceived or born during that time, when tested recently on the occasion of their induction into the army, proved to be no less intelligent than children who had not undergone this traumatic experience. Neither was there any increase in mental deficiency, either slight or marked. This strongly supports Jensen's position, showing that the often-assumed 'critical period' hypothesis for the effects of malnutrition is in fact invalid. In a similar vein, Johnson's study of MZ twins separated either at a mean age of 2 months, or at a mean age of 24 months, showed that the former were significantly more alike with respect to IQ; this again goes counter to a more general form of the 'critical period' hypothesis.

This, then, is the most up-to-date, thorough, and original book available at the moment in this field. It will be a long time before we see a better one.

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